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Abstract--We study stationary and non-stationary versions of the same game with different information 
structures. In a discrete set up, we find algorithms to calculate value and saddle-point, 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with different versions of the same basic game. The main difference comes with 
the information structure. Here, the information avai lable to each player is, apparent ly,  the same 
in all three versions of  the game, but in the last version, this same piece of  information is no longer 
the complete state of the game, because a time delay has been added. The first and second versions 
differ in that one is stat ionary,  with expected capture time as payoff, the second finite time, with 
probabi l i ty  of  capture before game end as the payoff. This same difference is found in the treatment 
of the Princess and Monster  on the circle game by Foreman [I]. His derivation in [1] for the 
stat ionary game relies on the hypothesis that a finite value exists for the game. Here, in a discrete 
set up, we are able to show the existence of  a value and saddle-point.  
2. THE GENERAL SET UP 
2. I. D .vnamics  
A rabbit  R jumps back and forth along a finite wall, in a discrete world. It can therefore be in 
a finite number,  N, of  locations and is al lowed to jump at each instant of  time, of a l imited jump 
size l. (We shall, for simplicity, cover mainly the cases where the jump is l imited to one unit or 
unlimited.) 
Let x, e l~. = {1 . . . . .  N } be the posit ion of  R. Let u, s U,,j(x,), where x + U,,j(x) c 1~, be its jump 
at time t, then the dynamics of  the rabbit  are simply 
x,+,  =x ,+u, .  (1) 
A hunter H watches the rabbit  and is trying to shoot it. We shall assume he has an arbitrari ly 
large number of  shots at its disposal. (Changing this to a given, finite number would only make 
the computat ions heavier by introducing an extra state variable, except if that number were one.) 
Let v,e I N be the posit ion at which H aims at time t. 
In Sections 3 and 4, we shall assume that the bullet reaches the wall in one step of  time. That 
is, a bullet hits the wall at z, at time t, with 
z,+ h = v,. (2) 
Capture is defined by 
tL =inf{t ;  x ,= z,}. (3) 
In the fifth section, we assume that the bullet takes several time steps to reach the wall. In 
practice, we shall only detail  the case with two time steps. It is clear how the method we shall use 
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generalizes for more time steps. Using the same definition for .z, and capture, (2) is now replaced 
by 
.FI + I z Ut ,  
(4) 
Zt  ~ I ~ .]:l " 
2.2. Strategies 
Although we have not yet completely described the payoff, there is no need to specialize in animal 
psychology to guess that the rabbit R will strive to survive as long as possible, while the hunter 
H will attempt o get his lunch ready. This will clearly involve mixed strategies that we introduce 
now. 
Let a mixed strategy for R at time t be a probability distribution p, on U,,,~(x), i.e. a vector of 
simplex Z~ 
p,( , )  = P(u, = u), P, • Y.c. (5) 
Likewise, q, will be a mixed strategy for H at time t, a vector of the simplex ZN 
q, (v )=P(v ,=v) ,  q, eZN.  (6) 
Both players have infinite memory, but while H sees R and knows where he has shot in the past, 
R does not know where H is shooting or has shot. (Otherwise, he would never get caught and would 
not need mixed strategies!) 
Let therefore 
X,={x, ,x ,  t . . . . .  xo], Y ,={y , ,Y ,  , . . . . .  Y0} if appropriate. (7) 
R must choose his mixed strategy p, as a function of X,; and so does H in Sections 3 and 4 [game 
(2)], while H has access to X, and Y, in Section 5 [game (4)] 
p, = 4,,[x,], 
q ,= ~P,[x,, Y,]. 
(8) 
2.3. Payoff  
Replacing u and ~, by mixed strategies like (5) or (6) in the game (2) [or (4)] makes x,, y, and 
z, stochastic processes, and therefore t~ in (3) a stopping time. 
In Section 3, the payoff that H will try to minimize, while R maximizes it, will simply be R's 
life expectation E(tl). This game will be called the stationary game. We shall look at it only in 
the complete information case (2) [and therefore no II, in (8)]. 
In Sections 4 and 5, we shall assume a time T is given (and known of both players) when the 
game warden is going to walk by forcing the hunter to leave (did we tell you he was a trespasser?). 
The payoff then shall be the probability for the hunter to kill the rabbit (probability of capture) 
P(t, <~ T) and, of course, R is seeking to minimize it while H is striving to maximize it. 
3. THE STAT IONARY GAME 
3.1. Problem statement 
The motion of the rabbit is described probabilistically as a Markovian matrix P =pij defined 
by 
def  
p, j=P(u ,= j - - i / x ,= i ) ,  pij>~O, y 'p i j= l ,  i 6 IN ,  je I  u. 
I~ lN  
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The hunter, knowing x,, chooses to shoot at any position in Ix with a certain probability. So 
the motion of the hunter is described probabilistically as a Markovian matrix Q = qij defined by 
dc[" 
qu=P(v ,=J /x ,= i ) '  qii>lO, ~ q~i=l" i~l~.,  j e Ix .  
Thus, if x, = i, the bullet will hit position j at time t + I with probability qii. 
It should be pointed out that we consider in this part of paper that Pii and q,/are independent 
of t, i.e. we study stationary strategies. 
Stationary strategies are motivated for our problem partly because of the infinite time horizon 
and partly because of their relative simplicity. We do not intend to imply that nonstationary ones 
can be of no relevance to the infinite time horizon problem that we study. 
Since the time interval considered here is infinite, the hunter can assure that he will kill the rabbit 
with probability one by choosing q~j= I /N, for all i and j in [~., a fact quite easy to demonstrate. 
Thus, in the infinite time case, what appears to be the pertinent objective of the hunter is the 
minimization of the average time within which the rabbit is killed. The rabbits' objective is the 
contrary so that the two players are engaged in a zero-sum dynamic game. 
It should be notice that the average time of killing is a function of the initial position of the 
rabbit, x0. Thus, if 2i denotes the average killing time if x0 = i, we have a vector 2 = (2~ . . . . .  2N)' 
of payoff objectives where the ' is the notation for the transpose. 
Several questions can be posed concerning the situation described above. 
First, for fixed P, what is the best Q and conversely, for fixed Q, what is the best P? 
Do they exist and if yes, can one find them in a convenient manner? 
If  there are no restrictions on the choices of P and Q, does there exist a saddle-point solution? 
If the matrix P is constrained to be of a certain form, for example Pu -- 0 if li - j [  t> l + 1 (i.e. 
the rabbit can move at most I positions to the right or the left of its current position x, = i), does 
a saddle point equilibrium exist and what is it? 
It should be borne in mind, that in all the questions mentioned, we are interested in the whole 
vector 2 = (2~ . . . . .  24.)' and would like the optimal pairs pertaining to the questions posed above 
to be optimal simultaneously for each component of ~ 
In the next sections, we study some of these questions, in the context of a simple example, and, 
in the later sections, we address them more generally. In the final conclusions ection, we present 
some further questions and problems intimately related to those studied here. 
3.2. Introductory example 
Let us consider I~ = { 1, 2} and the 
P =(1  
Let P be fixed and thus we have a 
following matrices P and Q 
- a \q21 qz2,/ 
single objective problem, i.e, choose Q as to minimize the 
average killing time. If x, = 1, it will necessarily be that x,+~ = I, so that the hunter obviously 
chooses ql~ = 1, qt,_ = 0. Therefore, the problem of the hunter is to choose q2~, q2z. Let us consider 
the following two possible choices for Q 
1 °0) ('0 0) 
and study first the situation under Q = Q~. Let x 0 = 2. 
Under QI, the hunter shoots always at position l if the rabbit is at position 2 (or position i). 
If z, denotes the time at which the rabbit is killed, given that it starts at time zero at position 2, 
i.e. x0 = 2, it holds for the following strategy (for t s { 1,2, 3, 4}, the rabbit chooses to go to position 
2 with probability a, at time t = 5, it chooses to go to position 2 with probability 1 - a) 
P(z2 = 5/xo = 2, Q = Ql) = a4(l - a). 
In general, we have 
P(zz=t )=a ' - l (1 -a ) ,  for t=1,2 ,3  . . . .  
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and thus. the average time for killing the rabbit is 
- ,  = E (z / .v , , .  Q = Q, ) 
= ~ ta' I ( l -a )  
¢ I 
I 
- i f  a<l .  
I -a  
If a = I, then the rabbit stays always at position 2, and is never killed: this is in agreement with 
l im,_ .~( I -a )  1= +,~.  
Let us now study the situation under Q = Q,_ and .v, = 2. There are now only two possible 
trajectories for the rabbit: 
if the rabbit starts at .v, = 2 and goes to position 2, it will be killed at time I and this happens 
with probability a, 
if the rabbit starts at x0 = 2 and goes to position 1, it will be killed at time 2 and this happens 
with probability 1 - a. 
Thus 
and 
P (z := 1/x0=2, Q=Qe)=a,  
P(zz = 2/'x0 =--,'~ Q = Q2) = 1 - a, 
P(z~=t,,'xo=2, Q=Q2)=O if t>~3, 
~=E(zz /xo=2,  Q =Q:)=a+2( l -a )=2-a .  
One can draw 5- 2 and ~ as a function of  a and the two curves intersect at a = (3 - v;5)/2. It i~ 
clear that 
if a belongs to [0, a], ?.2 < ~2 and Q~ is preferred over Q2, 
if a belongs to [~, 1], ~ < :5~ and Qe is preferred over Q~. 
For a-  h, both Q~ and Q2 result in the same average killing time 2 , (~)= ~,(~)= (1 + \/_~)/2. 
There are several interesting facts revealed by this simple example. One is that, although Q: 
guarantees that the rabbit will be killed no later than time 2, whereas Q~ allows the rabbit to be 
alive after an arbitrarily large time, Q~ is preferable if a belongs to [0, a]. 
In the context of  the example considered here with /x = { I, 2 I, the reader can easily persuade 
himself that a zero sum equilibrium cannot be formed by a pair of  matrices P* and Q* which have 
only zeros and ones. since, if, for example, the hunter shoots always at the position i when the 
rabbit is at position j, the rabbit will always go from i to k ¢ j .  And so, it will never be killed. 
Analogously can do the hunter and always kill the rabbit in the next instant of  time, if P* is 
composed of zeros and ones: thus, an equilibrium pair P*, Q* with zeros and ones cannot exist. 
Using the results of  the next sections, one can show that if the choices of  P and Q are arbitrar).. 
there exists a unique zero sum equilibrium pair P*, Q* with 
p*=Q*= 
1/2 1/2] '  
and the resulting average killing time 2,  if the rabbit starts at time t = 0 at x0 = i, i = 1,2, is 
- -  _ ,-} 
Actually, this pair (P*, Q*), constitutes a zero-sum equilibrium for either one of the costs E(zf) 
or E(z, ). 
Although it is reasonable to assume that Q is chosen arbitrarily by the hunter, i.e. that he can 
shoot anywhere he wants, it might not be so for P, i.e. the rabbit might be restricted as to where 
it can go within one instant of  time, due for example to its finite speed. Thus, one may be interested 
in investigating zero-sum equilibria subject to the constraint hat P is of  a certain form. 
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Let us examine a situation of  this type. Let it be that P is to be chosen of the form 
l - -a  
i.e. the rabbit can choose only a. 
The hunter suffers no restriction as to his choice of  Q, but it is obvious that he will choose qt~ = 1, 
q~2 = 0. Thus, the hunter chooses 
(,'q 
The average capture times can be calculated irectly, or by using the more general results of  the 
next section to be 
and it is easy to see that 
21 = 1, 22 -  
! + q( l  - a)  
1 + a ( l  - q ) '  
a=---~--3-~ and ? / - - l+x /~2 
constitute the zero-sum equilibrium with resulting value for ~2, (1 + x/5)/2, (i.e. the intersection 
point of  the two curves [fi, 22(fi)1 appears, as may be expected). 
Thus, we see that it is possible to have zero sum equilibria in cases where P is restricted, although 
not every restriction of  P will allow such an existence. The issue of  study of  zero-sum equilibria 
under some restrictions on the choice of P is undertaken in paragraph 3.5.2. 
3.3. Calculation of the average capture time 
For a given pair of  two N x N Markovian matrices P and Q, let z be the random variable that 
the rabbit is killed at some time; it obviously depends on P and Q as well as on the initial value 
of  x0. It holds 
N 
P(z = t + 1/Xo = i) = ~ P(z = t/Xo =j)pu( l  - qq), (9) 
J - [  
i.e, the probability that the rabbit is killed at time t + 1, given that it started at x 0 = i, equals 
the probability that it is not killed in going from x0 = i to some x~ =j  multiplied by the 
probability that it is killed at time t + 1 if it started at x~ =j  at time t = 1; the fact that 
P(z -- t + m/x ,  =j)  = P(z = t/xo =j) ,  which is due to the stationarity of  P and Q, is also used 
with m = 1 in deriving (9), Let 
P(~ = t + llxo = 1) 
Y,+,= IP (z=t+l lxo=2)  
[~_P(Z = t +il/xo = N) 
and 
r Pll qll 
P • Q je=r I P21.q21. 
LPNI qNI 
(9) can be written as 
Yt + I = Ly,, 
PlZql2 "'" PINqIN] 
P22qz2 . .  P2UqZU ] 
PN2qN2 " PNNq~,'N3 
L =P-P*Q.  
t =! ,2 ,3  . . . . .  y l=(P*Q)e .  
If some Pij = 0, i.e. the rabbit does not ever go from position i to position j, the hunter can 
obviously choose qq = 0, since a shot at position j will be an obvious waste. Thus, without loss 
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of generality, we assume that 
pi: = 0 ~ q,/= 0. ( I 0) 
Gregorskin's theorem, applied to the matrix L, yields that all the eigenvalues ). of L lie in the 
disc 
N V 
),;~1 ~< max ~ pi/(l -q , )  = 1 - min ~ p~jq,/. 
i /=I i /=1  
Under assumption (10), it holds that 
)-I ~ 1 -- min {p,: ;p, ,> 0} < 1, 
i,j 
and thus, the matrix L has all its eigenvalues trictly within the unit disc of the complex plane. 
This guarantees that y, tends to 0. e as t tends to + oc. So, the matrix inverses, series forms and 
infinite series differentiations that will be used next, are valid. It holds 
P(z < + w.J) =),, + Y2 +Y3 + ""  
= .l'j + L)'a + L~-yl + " ' "  
=( l -L )  ly I 
=( I -P+P*Q)  ' (P*Q)e.  
Since Pe = e, it holds 
and 
( l -P+P,Q)e=(P*Q)e  i.e. ( I - L )e=y, ,  
P(z< +oo)=e.  (11) 
Since P(z = + 3c) = 0, we can calculate the average capture time 2 by 
+~ 
-5 = ~ ty ,=( I -L )  'e, 
t - - ]  
where (1 1) may be used in the last step. Thus 
2=( I -L )  ~e =( l -  P + P ,Q)  'e. (12) 
Formula (12) will be used repeatedly in the sequel. 
3.4. The hunter's problem 
The hunter's problem is to minimize - with respect to Q, P being fixed. 
Here, we consider the problem 
minE=min( I -P  +P ,Q)  le. (13) 
Q Q 
Notice that we are interested in Qs that minimize all the components of 2- simultaneously. 
One way of going about this problem is the following. It is known that the inverse of an N × N 
matrix A, assuming it exists, has (i, j)th elements (-l)i+JlAjiJ/IA I, where IAI is the determinant of 
A and IA fji is the determinant of  the minor of  the (j, i) element of A. Thus, it is easy to see that 
although each component,  say 2-j, of  2 is a quotient of  nonlinear functions of the q~/s, these 
nonlinear functions are multi l inear in the sense that they are linear in each qo, the rest of the 
q,js considered fixed. Thus, the extremal values of 2j can be achieved at a Q, the elements of 
which are zeros and ones. Consequently, one may minimize 2~ by checking which ones of  these 
(N 2 in multitude) Q s results in the smallest value. I f  one is interested in minimizing all the 
components of -5 simultaneously, one may check whether this is possible by calculating 2 for all 
such Qs and find whether such solution exists and what it is. This procedure is quite cumbersome 
and as it stands quite uninformative. If one considers in addition that such Qs cannot serve as pairs 
of zero-sum equilibrium, one is bound to search for a different method for handling (13). 
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Let us consider that a given choice Q results in 2 and that another choice (~ results in ~. Thus, 
( I -  P + P • Q)2 = e and ( I -  P + P * (~)~ = e. We assume that (10) holds for both Q and (~. 
Let ~=2+6,6eRN.  It holds 
6=( I -P+P*Q)  ~(P ,Q-P ,O , )2 .  
It is obvious that all the elements of P - P • Q and of P - P * (~ are nonnegative and since it 
holds 
( I -P+P*Q)  '=( I - (P -P*O_) )  '= I+(P -P*O, )+(P -P*Q)2+. . .  (14) 
and similarly for (I - P + P * Q)-~. 
Thus, if we want (~ to be preferable over Q, it must be 6 ~< 0, so we have 
(P • Q - P • (~)2 ~<0. (15) 
If, by a choice of (~, we make the first component of (P • Q - P • 0)2 negative and the other 
components less or equal than zero, we have guaranteed that all the components of 6 will be less 
or equal than zero. In addition, the first component of 6, 6t will be strictly negative since the unit 
matrix in the right-hand side of (14) guarantees that the first element of the first raw of 
(1 - P + P • Q) is strictly positive. For example, if 
PltZl-- max{pl~ zl ,PI2Z'2, . . .  ,P lNZU}, 
we can choose the first raw of (~ by 
i~l 1 . . . .  = l~ l ( l _ l )=01( /+ l  ) . . . .  =t~IN=0,  0,t= 1, 
and the other raws of Q to be the same as those of Q, which results in 
"-p~12t+ ~ p~jq~jV-i 
16 I~ 
(p ,Q  -p ,Q)2  = 0 ~<0. 
0 
No reduction of value in going from (Q, 2) to some (Q, ,~) is possible by changing only the first 
raw of Q if 
which is equivalent to 
Pll qtl-Zl "t'- " " " -{- P lNq IN2N >/ P l l  21 . . . . .  Pl , '~2N, 
p, j2j=pl/21, Vj, l with ptj4:0 and p1/~0. 
The proof of the following theorem is a straightforward application of the ideas delineated 
above. 
Theorem 1 
(i) There exists a Q that minimizes imultaneously all the components 2L . . . . .  24, of 2-. 
(ii) A Q is optimum if and only if 
pij-Sj=pi12t, Vi, j,l with pij=/=O, pit=/=O, (16) 
where the -is are the solution of (13) for the aforementioned Q.
An algorithm for finding all the optimal Qs is the following 
Step 1: Choose a Q --Qt,  so that condition (10) is satisfied. Calculate 
5~=( I -P+P*QI )  le, 21=(2tl . . . . .  2N1) r. 
Step 2: Calculate pi,2 i for Pii :/= 0. 
Step 3: Find for each i, the 1 for which 
Pil'Ei = max (Pil•lL, p i2221,  . . .  , P iN2Xl  ). 
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Step 4: Choose Q2 such that q~z = 1 for each i, where l is the l found for this i in the step 3. 
Step 5: Set Q = Q2. 
This algorithm will converge in a finite number of steps. It operates essentially on the extreme 
points of the set of the N x N Markovian Qs and will converge much faster than the primitive 
algorithm suggested in the paragraph 5. which checks N 2 possible Qs since it reduces imulta- 
neously all the components of 2. 
It is also clear that, as soon as an optimum has been found, all the other optima Q can 
be generated as follows if Q is optimal consider for each i, the ls for which 
p,t2t = max(p,21t . . . . .  p~2u~) where 2, = (2~ . . . . .  2,u~)' corresponds to the optimal Q* that has 
been found. Any Q, which has at the ith raw q~j = 1 for any j  for which the maximum of the p~j2/s 
for j = 1 to N, is achieved, is also optimal. 
The set of convex combinations of all these Qs is the solution set of problem (13). Finally, by 
construction of the algorithm (I - P + P * Qk) ~ exists at each step k, i.e. (I0) will be automatically 
satisfied throughout the operation of the algorithm. 
Examph, 
Let 
Step 1: Let 
Then 
/1/3 2/3 0 \ 
P=[1 /4  1/4 !/2 . 
\1/5 2/5 2/5/ 
Q ,= 1 . 
o 
-i =( I -  P + P * Qi ) - le  = 
3+3/17\  
3 + 6/34 J. 
2 + 16/17/ 
Using the criterion of the step 3, we choose 
Q2 = 0 which yields 
1 
Notice that 22 is better than 51 componentwise. 
Using again the criterion of the step 3, we choose 
_ /1+1/2 \  
,+  5 /6 /  
\2 + 5/18/ 
(i'i) tl+,J2 Q3 = 0 which yields 23 =~ 1  5/6 J. 
0 \2 + 1/30/ 
Use of the criterion 3 shows that this is the optimal 2. It is worth noticing that in this example, 
q~j equals one at the position of the raw-maxima of the pos. 
This is not in general true as other examples can demonstrate. As a matter of fact, a simple 
continuity argument can show that Q3 remains optimum if we perturb the last raw of P into 
(I/5, 2/5 +~, 2 /5 -  ~) where E > 0, ~ small, so that the optimal Q3 for this new P will not have 
q32 = l, whereas P32 > P3~, P32. It is nonetheless reasonable to expect hat large p, js deserve large qijs, 
so that a good initial choice of Q for starting the algorithm is obviously to choose qi/= I for 
P~I = max{pik;k = 1 . . . . .  N}. 
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Before leaving this section, it is worth pointing out an intuitive justification of the first part of 
the theorem. 
First, a simple continuity and compactness argument shows that there exist Q s which 
minimize 2g. 
Secondly, let us assume that Qi minimizes ='i, i = 1 . . . . .  N at time t, the hunter shoots according 
to the j th  raw of Qj. I f  he fails to kill the rabbit, which now at time t + I is at x, + t = k, he uses 
the kth raw of Q~, whereas common sense suggests that the kth raw of Qj is pertinent now. 
The fact that there exists a Q that minimizes ='t . . . . .  =,s, can also be justified by the fact that the 
control of the hunter can be expected to be of the feedback type by which at position x, = i, the 
ith raw of Q gives the optimal control. 
3.5. The rabbit's problem 
The rabbit 's problem is to maximize 2- with respect to P, Q being fixed. 
Here we consider the problem 
maxS=max( I -P+P*Q)  Le. (17) 
P P 
Let Pt correspond to 2~ and P2 correspond to 22. It holds 
( I  - P~ + PI * Q)2t = (I - -  P2 + P2 * Q)='2 = e. 
Let 6 = =,~- =-,. So, we have 
6 =( I -P2+P2*Q)  ~( (P2-P . ) - (P2 -P~)*Q)=' , ,  
where we assume that (10) holds for both PI and P2. Here, we are interested in increasing =,, i.e. 
we would like to move from =,, to 22 with 6 7> 0, We cannot increase 6 if 
N 
=,i(1 -- q,j) ~< ~ =,jp,j(l -- q,s), J = 1 . . . . .  N, 18) 
) - I  
or equivalently if 
2j( l - -qi j )=22k(1--q~k), Vi, j , k  with p , i¢0  and p ,k¢0.  (19) 
For example, if p~ . . . . .  P~k are not zero and P~k-u . . . . .  PIN are zero, it should hold 
zL( 1 - qll) . . . . .  zk(l -- qlk). (20) 
The whole development of the previous section can also be carried out here in a completely 
analogous fashion but we omit it for the sake of brevity. The only difference is that if P satisfies 
(10), and (18) does not hold for some ( i , j )  and we update P accordingly to some P~ which yields 
a =,~ greater, there is no guarantee that P3 satisfies also (10), so that some of the components of 
-~ may be infinite. 
3.5.1. The zero-sum case with unrestricted P. If pi j = 1/N, for i and j in Ix, (13) yields that =_ -- Ne 
for any Q. Similarly, if q, j= I/N, for i and j  in I~, (13) yields that =, =Ne for any P. 
Thus the pair (P*, Q*), such that for all i and j  in l,~,pi* = q* -- 1/N, is a zero-sum equilibrium, 
for each component  of the vector =,. The averaging capture time at the equilibrium is N units of 
time, i.e. it equals the dimension of P (and Q). The remaining question is whether there exists 
another zero-sum equilibrium (P, Q_). I f  it does, it will hold for all Q and all P 
J (P,  Q) >~ J(P,  0,) = J(P,  Q*) = Ue = J (P* ,  Q) >~ J(P,  (~), (21) 
where J (P, Q) denotes 2- = (1 - P + P • Q) le. The left-hand side of (21), in conjunction with the 
condition (15) for optimality of Q -- (~ yields (/3 • Q* - /5 ,  (~)=, >/0 for any Q, i.e. 
/5,, (q* - q,, )N + .. .  +/3,.v(q,*,- cT,~)N >~ 0. (22) 
But q* = 1IN and Z'Y'~= ~/~j = 1, so (22) yields 1IN >~tS,~fL~+ "'" +l~uq~.~,, for any (~ and thus, for 
any i,j, 1/N >~13~j which implies ~,, = I /N =p* ,  i.e. P* = P. Since (~ is an optimal response to P*. 
it has to satisfy (20) with ='2 = N and thus Q = Q*. We have thus 
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Theorem 2 
If  there is no restriction on P or Q, there exists a unique zero-sum equilibrium which is 
I /N. . .  I/N I 
P*=Q*= : '. " (23a) 
\ l iN. . ' .  I /N/ 
with optimal value for 2 = 
3.5.2. The zero-sum solution Jor a class of constrained Ps. In this section, we assume that P is 
restricted so as to reflect the fact that the rabbit, due to its finite speed, cannot move further than 
1 positions, i.e. we assume that Pu= 0 if t J -  il ~> (l + I), l ~> 1, so we have 
p = 
P l l  
P2i 
P(/+ I)1 
P12 " ' '  PI l l+I) 
P22 " ' '  P21t+I) P2{l+2, (0 )  
• . , • . . , • - . . . 
• , . . . . . 
P l l+  I)2. - .  "" . .  
P( l+2)2 ' - " • • . .  
• . . • , . . 
(0) 
• , . . • . . . 
• P,vi P.~'~.x i) 
(24) 
P(N l)u 
P{ N I )A' 
P ,"v' N 
Obviously, if a zero-sum equilibrium P*, Q* exists, it will be qi* = 0 if Ji - j [  >~ (l + I). Let us 
examine whether such an equilibrium with p* :~ 0, for li - J l  < (l + l) exists• If  it does, and the 
associated optimal value is z*= (z* . . . . .  z~,), it must hold 
and thus 
• . , _  ,7 ,  l i - j l<( l+ l ) ,  pq,~j  - -P ikeD,  l i - k i  <( l+  1), 
I( - '+" - )  pi* = ! z* ~ . (25a) k = ma×[ l . i  / ]  
Also using (19), we obtain that 
q,* = I - (rain [N, i + l ] -  max[ I ,  i - l ] -  I)p*, (25b) 
where p,* is defined by (25a). 
We can write P* and Q* in a more compact form by introducing the following notation• Let 
E be an N x N matrix with each (i,j) element equal to 1 if Ji - J l  ~< l and 0 otherwise• E has the 
same structure as P in (24) but with one's in place of  the pi/s. 
Let e = (1 . . .  1)' in R x and 
: , p = Ee - -  e. 
p*  : ( ll']~i 
\ (o) 
/ (26a) 
Then 
Q* = E _ 1 / pl/']~I 
\ (o) 
E " ' .  , 
..,/z U o l i=* l  
(26b) 
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For the P*, Q*, z* to exist [since the choice Q as in (23a) is also admissible, we know that if 
P* and Q* are optimal, (10) will be satisfied since the resulting z* has to be finite] and satisfy (13) 
and (25), it must hold 
(I - P*  + P*  • Q*)z*  = e. (27)  
Substituting P* and Q* from (26) into (27) yields 
z* - "'. Ee + • = e. (28) 
\ (0) 1/~/ 1/~,/ 
Introducing for any i in IN, 
ai = 1/z*, 
denoted by (29), we can write (28) in the following equivalent form: let 
(29) 
E = =E(a)  and Ee-e=p= 
u S P 
Zi Vi e I N. (30) 
ai - Z~ + Pi' 
what we need to show is the existence of a nonzero solution of (30). To prove existence, we 
introduce the function f from Ru+ to R N such that, for any x in Ru+, we have f (x )= y with 
yi = max [e, ~ . ] ,  VieL~,  
where f; is defined by the first equality of (20) and c in [0, 1] will be specified shortly. First, notice 
that f i s  continuous andf([e, 1] s)___ [e, 1] N by construction. Thus, by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, 
fhas  a fixed point. But for our purpose, i.e. existence of a nonzero solution of (30), the fixed point 
of f would be worthless if e is such that, for some of the components of the fixed point of f ,  x = y, 
we have xi = yi = c > ['2~(x)]/(l~ + pj). To exclude that this holds for the fixed point o f f ,  for any 
x~, we work as follows. If  it holds for x~, it will be 
£,(x) cp~ 
- -  > £ , (x ) .  
x~ = yi = ( > P~ + ~(x)  =~ 1 - c 
But 
Z,(x) = Ex >i. E =eEe =c(p  +e)=c ' , 
oN;N/  
and thus 
~Pi 1 
- -  > c (p ,+ i )=>c > - -  
1 -~ ps+ 1 
Thus, if c < 1/p, + 1, it cannot be that the fixed point x = y o f f  satisfies 
£(x) 
x i  = Y i  "= (~ 
p, + £(x)" 
To exclude that this happens for any component of the fixed point, it suffices to choose 
1 
c < - ~. (31) 
l + max(p~ . . . . .  PN) 
With such an c, the fixed point o f f  serves also as a nonzero solution of (30). 
Since any solution of (30) creates through (26), (29) a solution to the zero-sum game at hand 
and since the value of this game is uniquely determined, we immediately conclude that (30) not 
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only has a solution, but a unique one. Also, this solution satisfies ai >/e for any E < ~ and thus 
z* = I/at ~< l/c, i.e. the average capture time at the zero-sum equilibrium is less or equal than 2l + 1, 
which is a much better bound than the already mentioned bound N, especially if N is much larger 
than l. 
Remark: notice that p =( l , l+ l  . . . . .  2 l -1 ,21 ,21  . . . . .  21 ,21 ,21-1  . . . . .  l ) '  if N>/21+l ,  
p=( l , l+ l  . . . . .  N -1 ,  N -1  . . . . .  l ) '  i fN~<2l+l  and thusg=( l+2 l )  J, correspondingly. 
It is also clear that one can slightly modify the definition o f f  as to define it only for x symmetrics, 
i.e. x~ = XN, X2 = XN-~ . . . . .  which will guarantee that the fixed point is symmetric and thus z* = z*, 
z* =ZN_* ~, and so on, which will guarantee that the ith row of P* (or Q*) is the mirror image 
of  its N - i+ l  row. 
Finally, since any solution of  (30) provides the value vector of  the zero-sum game at hand, which 
is uniquely determined one concludes that (30) has unique nonzero solution. The only thing missing 
is an algorithm for finding the solution of  (30), since the obviously suggested iteration xk +, =.f(xk)  
is not guaranteed to produce the solution even as one of its cluster points. In this paragraph, we 
are going to remedy this weakness. Let us consider the function g from R~ to R N defined by 
g(x)  = v with 
£~(x) 
Vi E [~. (32) 
" £ i (x )+p~ 
It holds 
p,/(p, + £, (x)/ 
Vg(x) = E '  "- 
(o) 
Let us consider the iteration x~+~=g(xk) .  It holds 
(0) ]. 
pN/(p, + £Ax))2/ 
x~,+l - xl  = (Vg,(xk))'~ '(xk - x~ ,). (33a) 
where 2 ;  is some vector in Ru+, for i = 1 . . . . .  N. Since Vg(x) has nonnegative lements, if 
x~./> x~ l, it will be xk +l ~> xk. Thus, if we can find an initial point x0 to start the iteration, with 
g(Xo) >>-xo and x 0 ¢ 0 we are guaranteed to create an increasing sequence of vectors {xk} which 
is obviously bounded in [0, 1] u [see (32)] and thus we have guaranteed convergence of x k to 
some x*¢0  which solves x*=g(x* ) .  We claim that any Xo=~e, denoted by (33b), where 
0 < ~ < ~" = 1/(1 + max (Pl . . . . .  PN)) performs this task. It holds 
and thus 
E(Ee) = EEe = ~(p + e) = +i) 
PN+ 
g(~e)= y with y i (~e) -  
c(pi + 1) 
P i+E(P i+ 1) 
(33b) 
~(Pi+ 1) 1 
>/~ or c < - -  (34) 
P, +~(P i+ l) 1 +Pi" 
It suffices 
Thus, if ~<f  and we start the iteration x~.+,=g(x , )  with any initial condition 
x0 = ~e, ~ < ~, ~ ¢ 0, we will create an increasing sequence converging to a solution of  (30). 
Similarly, if we wish to have a decreasing sequence of xks, it suffices that, at the first step, 
g(Xo) <~ Xo. For example, if x0 = a = pe for some/z > 0, in order to have g(xo) <~ xo, it suffices that 
Ei(xo)/(pi+ £~(x0)) ~</t or Z~(x0) ~< pip/(1 - p) or # >~ (1 + p,) i for all is which is equivalent 
to #>~( l+ l ) - t .  If we do not wish to choose x0=/~e, since it holds that 
£~/(£ i + pi)~< (p~ + 1)/(2p~ + I)(E/Z + p) is an increasing function of  Z), it suffices to choose the 
ith component of  x 0 greater than (1 + p~)/(1 + 2p,). In conclusion, if 
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- - i  ((1 - pl)/(1 + 201) /
x0=#e,  l~>kt>(l+/------ ~ or e>~xo>>, " , (35) 
(1 + pu)/(1 + 2pu)/ 
the iteration Xk + ~ = g(Xk) creates a decreasing sequence and thus {Xk } converges. It is conceivable 
that since {Xk} is decreasing, it might converge to zero, in which case this iteration would not 
provide a nonzero solution of (30). But, this can be excluded by showing that it is not possible 
to have g(x) <~ x for x sufficiently close to zero. The proof is the following. 
For x close to 0, it holds gi(x)= g~(O)+ (Vg~(Yg))'x or 
(Pl/(Pl + £,(Y')) 2 . 
g(x~)=/ .. (o) )Ex, 
(0) PN/(Pu + ~N(2U))2/ 
where .?' is in [0, x], for i = 1 . . . . .  N. If the algorithm with decreasing XkS converges to zero, it will 
be 
Pl/(Pl + £1(2~)) 2 (0) ] 
g(x,) = "'. EXk <~ Xk. (36) 
(0) Pu/(Pu + £u(2~))2/ 
It is clear from the form of g (32), that if Xk = 0 then Xk_ i = 0 and thus, as long as x0 4: 0, it 
will be x k ¢ 0 for every k. Let 6k = X/llXk I1 and divide both sides of (36) by IlXklt to get 
Pll(Pl + E1(2~)) 2 (0) ] 
"'. E6k <~ 6k. (37) 
(0) PN/(PN + "ZN(2#)) 2/ 
Since ][6k II = 1, there is a subsequence of {6~} which converges to some 5, 116 [I = 1, 6 >~ 0. For 
this subsequence, the corresponding subsequences of 2~,s go to zero for i = 1 . . . . .  N, and thus 
taking limits with respect o this subsequence in (37) yields 
"-. E6~<~ or E6<~ "'. & 
\ (0) l/PN/ (0) PN/ 
Multiplying both sides with e' and using (30) yields 
( l+p~ . . . . .  l+pN)6<.~. (p  1 . . . . .  pN)6 or  61- -~ • • - - J f -6N ~ 0 ,  
But this cannot be for 6 = (6~ . . . . .  6N) '  >~ 0 and 113 I[ = 1. Thus, we conclude that any sequence 
Xk+t=g(Xk) with Xk+l ~< Xk cannot converge to zero. 
We have thus established two algorithms, the one increasing, if x 0 is as in (33b) and the other 
decreasing, if x0 is as in (34) which provide in the limit the solution of (30). One can carry out the 
first steps of these algorithms to create upper and lower bounds for the z~s. 
Thus, starting with x0 = (1 + 21)-le, we calculate g(xo)>1 Xo and a i is greater or equal to the 
ith component of g(xo); starting with x0 = (1 + l)-~, we calculate g(.20) >i x0 and ag is less or equal 
to the ith component of g(~0). It turns out 
Pi l + ~p~Pi (l + 2l) >~ zi>~ l +- - ( l  + + pi 
For z~, this means 
l 
1 + 2 l - - - -  >~z~ >~ 1 + l .  (38) 
1+/  
For Zm somewhere in the middle, where Pm = 2/, we have 
l 
2 /+ l '  
1 + 2l >~ zm>~ 1 + 21 + - -  (39) 
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The bounds (38) and (39) are in agreement with the fact that we expect he average capture times 
for i close to 1 and N, to be smaller than those corresponding to is far from I to N, since the closer 
the rabbit starts to the barrier (i.e. i = 1 or N) the more restricted its moves are. 
Having established the existence of a solution of (30), it is trivial to show that the P*, Q* 
constructed as.in (26) provide a zero-sum solution to the game. By arguments similar to those used 
in the part 3.5.1., one can show that it is unique. 
Let us formally state the results of this part in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2 
The zero-sum game, with P restricted as in (24), admits a unique solution given by (26) where 
the z*s are found by solving (29) and (30). The solution can be found by finding the ais that solve 
(30), by using the iteration xk+ ~ = g(xk), where g is given in (32) and .x'o is as in (35) or xo = ce, 
where 0 < c <L  and ?- is given in (31). 
3.6. Interpretation off the solution 
Having derived the optimal strategies, let us elaborate on their meaning. Before doing that, let 
us find out where the rabbit spends most of its time. Since P* is clearly composed of a single ergodic 
class, it holds 
lira _1 L pk= ep', 
n~ +-x~ n k_  0 
where /~ '=/2 'P  is a probability vector. It can be verified that 
la=~ O=ZaiY i= Za , .  
t= l  t= l  
Let 2 = Q'/~; pi denotes the probability with which the rabbit will be at position i, after the lapse 
of a lot of time, assuming it is still alive, and 2~ denotes the probability that the hunter will shoot 
at position i, i.e. 2 gives the distribution of the bullets as time goes to infinity. Let us proceed now 
with some intuitive interpretations of what happens, by employing an example. Example: let N = 3, 
l = 1. Calculating the ais, z~s, P, Q,/t, 2 at the optimum yields 
al = a3 = 0.453, a: = 0.375, 
z I=z  3=2.207, z2=2.666, 
Zr=Z3=0.824.  E2= 1.281, 
t0 , 0 / t04, 01 
 /002  029, 
0.45 0.55 1 0.55 0.45I 
to.3o \ 
1[0.390J, x /0.499;,  0=(1 ,0 ,0 ) .  /~=~ = 
\0.3051 \0.250I 
Thus, the average xpected time for the rabbit to leave, increases, the further, the rabbit starts 
at t = 0, from the boundary (z2 > zt ). The rabbit has a tendency to move to the boundary whereas 
the hunter prefers to shoot more towards the middle. One can say, intuitively, that the hunter 
exhibiting a tendency to shoot more towards the middle, forces the rabbit towards the boundary, 
where the restricted moves of the rabbit make easier the hunters' task. Nonetheless, things are 
such that the rabbit ends up spending more time around the middle (since #2 >/h  = P3) where 
his life expectation is higher (z2 > Zl = z3) and actually that is where most of the bullets fall 
(22 = 0.499 > ),1 = 23 = 0.25). Thus, two different endencies appear. At each instant of time (short 
time horizon), the rabbit moves towards the boundary, forced by the hunter's tendency to shoot 
more in the middle. But in the long term horizon, the rabbit frequents more the middle where his 
life expectation is higher and similarly the hunter ends up most of his bullets there. 
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The stationary strategies applied to the finite horizon game. 
It is worthy finding out in what situations, the stationary strategies are good for finite time 
problems. This obviously concerns the magnitute of the time horizon• 
It holds y,+~ = (P - P • Q)y , ,y ,  = (P • Q)e and 
P(z<~te)=y~+. . .+y ,=e-  "'. (P ,P )  e. 
(0) p , /  
Thus 
(P *P)e = 
A I 
"A 
max = 1 . . . . .  N)e  = 0e 
with 
Thus, if 
A=E " 
\aTe~ 
"'. (P ,P )  e<~O'e 
(o) 
and if 0 < 1, 0 gives a rate of convergence of l im,~+~P(z  ~< te )=e.  This can now be used as 
follows. The stationary strategy applied to the finite time horizon problem with time horizon ts, 
will give a very good strategy for the hunter, who will kill the rabbit fast in average times 2~ . . . . .  2~.. 
and the killing will take place with probabi l i ty 99% = 1 - c, c = 10 2 if O!r < 10 ~2 i.e. 
2 
tj > Ilog,001" (40) 
Let us show that 0 < 1, by calculating explicitly a 0 with 0 ~< 0- < 1. We will need the following 
fact 
x~ + ""  + x~, c~ + (N- -1)c~ 
if q<~x,~c2,  i= l , . . . ,N ,q ,L2>O , then qS(x) ~< 
(XI -~- " ' " -~ XN) 2 (~2 + (N - l )q )2" 
The proof  of this fact is as follows: if ~h(x) achieves its max imum in the interior of the constraint 
set, it will be x~ . . . . .  xt¢ and the value of ~b will be 1IN. Checking now the values of ~b at the 
boundary,  it is easy to show that ~ achieves its max imum by taking (N - 1) components of x to 
equal the min imum value q and only one component  of x to equal the maximum value ~2. 
Using this fact and taking q = 1/(2l + 1), E2 = l/(l + 1), we can show that 
I2~ (~2 + p ,~)  ~ 
Thus 
1 1 Ai (~ + piL22, with q - c2-  
Pi E-~i ~ Pi (E 2 + pif.i) 2l + 1 ' 1 + I 
6 
We can now use the fact that, if 0 < 2~ < 42 then 
41 (C2..~_21(I)2~'~2 (~2"~-22~1) 2' 
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to show that 
Ai c~ + 21E~ 
Pi~i i ~ 21(C 2 + 21Ei)2 =7. 
Letting E~ = 1/(2l + 1), c2 = 1/(l + 1) in the preceding equality, we find 
A 414+1613+1212+21 
max pi~/=O <~t7 - 414+ 1613 + 1212+2l+812+61 + I 
Thus 
<1. 
1 0= 
812 + 6l + 1 
1+ 
414+ 16l 3 + 12l 2 + 2l 
is a number smaller than 1, (which is independent of N)  and can be used in (40), in place of 
0 to provide lower bounds for the duration of the game, in order that the stationary strategies are 
"good" for the finite time case. Notice, that for l large 
1 2 
6~ ~1 
2-  / 2' 
l+p 
ti~> 
2 l 2 
- - lnE .  
1Og l0( l - -~) -2  
and thus 
So that for large l, we have t/~ 12/21n(1 -~) where p is the desired probability of killing. 
4. F IRST VERSION OF THE NON-STATIONARY GAME 
Let q~ and ~ be given strategies. Let the payoff J(q~, ~)  be the probability that R be killed at 
time T or before knowing the initial state. Let the stopping time 
/ in f{ t ; te{1  . . . .  ,T}  and x ,=z,} 
ts= I,T if ¥ t~{1 . . . . .  T}x,~z,. 
We use the same payoff and stopping time in Sections 4 and 5. 
We use dynamic programming to solve this game. 
4.1. Setup 
Let g', 7* be given strategies. Let W(x, t) be the probability that R be killed at time T or before 
when x, = x. We have 
W(x,t)= ~" (p(u)q(u+x)+ Y. p(u)q(v)W(x+u,t+l)). 
uE Uad(X) t'EIN;I' # .V + u 
R wants to minimize this probability and H to maximize. Isaacs' optimality principle gives us 
the optimal value 
V(x,t)=minmax( ~ p(u)q(u+x)+ ~" p(u)q(v)V(x+u,t+l)), 
P~'U qE'i'N UEUad(X) t'EIN;V ~.~ +.I' 
= min maxp'B,+ i(x)q. 
P~$'U qE]~N 
where B,+j(x) is a matrix of dimension less or equal to N × (N + 1). 
Therefore, we have to solve a matrix game at each stage of the dynamic programming algorithm. 
The equivalence between solving such a problem and solving a linear programming problem gives 
us the existence of a mixed saddle point for this game. 
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4.2. Results  and some properties 
We show some properties of symmetry with respect to x, so we can study the game for x in 
{1 . . . . .  N /2}  if N is even or x in { I , . . . , (N  + 1)/2} if N is odd. 
Typical results are as follows for l = 1. 
Let a = V(x  - 1, t + 1), b = V(x,  t + 1) and c = V(x  + 1, t + 1). For  the game value, we have 
b(1-c )+( l -b )  
V( l , t ) -  
(I - c)+(1 -b )  ' 
a b c 
14 + 
(1 -a )  (1 -b )  (1 -c )  
V(x,  t) = 
! 1 1 
+ + 
( l - -a )  ( l -b )  ( l - - c )  
and 
for x¢!  
1/3 ~< V(x,  T - 1) ~< 1/2 Vx, 
1/2~< V(x , t )~<l  Vx and t 4 :T - l ,  
V(x  + 1, t) ~ V(x,  t) <~ V(x  + 1, t - 1) ~< V(x,  t - 1) V(x, t). 
So that the table of Vs against x and t can be easily computed. We give an example for N = 12: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
T-  1 1/2 
T-  2 0.7140 
T -  3 0.8330 
T -  4 0.9000 
T - 5 0.9400 
T -  6 0.9640 
1/3 U3 1/3 1/3 1/3 
0.6000 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 
0.7570 0.7140 0.7040 0.7040 0.7040 
0.8500 0.8200 0.8050 0.8050 0.8050 
0.9100 0.8800 0.8700 0.8688 0.8683 
0.9450 0.9260 0.9160 0.9127 0.9123 
For  the optimal strategies, we have 
For R 
For  H 
For R andx#l  
1 
~,* [ l ] (0 )  - l -b '  
l+ - -  
l - c  
i 
• *[l](1) = 
l - - c "  
14- - -  
1 -b  
f 
#,~[1] ( l )  i f  v = 1, 
~[1] (v )= ~[1] (0 )  if v =2,  
0 otherwise. 
~[x] ( - l )=  
~?[x](O)= 
1 -a  l - -a '  
1 +Ts-~_ b + 1-~-~ 
1 -b  1 -b '  
l +T~_a+ l -S  7 
1 -c  1 -c  
1 +T~-a + T=-~ 
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For H andx¢ l  
fl - 2q~*[x](v -x )  if t, =x  - l , x ,x  + 1, 
7J*[x](v) = 
0 otherwise. 
At x and t fixed, the probability that R jumps in x + I is less than the probability that R stays 
in x which is less than the probability that R jumps in x - 1. 
~*[x] (1) ~< q~*[x](0) ~< 4~*[x](--1). 
At x fixed, x 4: 1, the probabil ity that R jumps in x - 1 decreases and the probability that R 
jumps in x + 1 increases when t increases. 
4,*[x](-  l) 4 4,,* , [x l ( -  l) 
¢,*[x](1) ~> @* ,[x](l). 
The properties of  (~u,*[x])(~., t are derived from the properties of  (q'*[x]).,,i. 
5. SECOND VERSION OF THE NON-STAT IONARY GAME 
5.1. Definitions 
Let now the bullet take two time steps to reach the wall. The game is described by (1), (3) 
and (4). 
Let U, = (u0 . . . . .  u,) and V t = (v0 . . . . .  v,). We can remark that Yt = V,_ i and X, = (Xo, U, ~). 
The players' information are given by 
- - fo r  H, (X,, Y,) or (Xo, U,_}, V, l) for all t in {0 . . . . .  T}, 
- - fo r  R, (xo,Yo, Zo) for t=0and X, or (x0, U~ i) for all t in  {1 . . . .  ,T} .  
R knows exactly x at each time t, so we can introduce a distribution law Q, on the space IN for 
y. This law depends on 
- - the  strategy of  H at t - !, denoted by ~,_ ~, 
- -Qt -  i, 
- - the  information of  R at t - 1, x ,  ~. 
Q,(y) is the a posteriori probabil ity that yt equals y. Let E be defined by 
E= Q=(Q(0)  . . . . .  Q(N))~[O,I] x+' ;  ~ O(y)=l ,Q(O)=O or Q(0)=I  . 
I - -0  
At time t, the strategies of  the two players are defined by 
- -R ' s  strategy depends on its state, x in I.v and Q a distribution law in IN 
oh,Ix, Q] = p,, 
- -H 's  strategy depends on R's state, x in IN, the control V, ~ that he has chosen at time t - 1 
or y in iu and Q a distribution law in I~. 
tP,[x,),, Q] = q,. 
Then, we can write explicitly the dependance between Q, and Q,_ 
Q , (y )= ~ Q,_ t ( j )T ,  ,[x,j,Q, , ]0 ' ) ,  for t~>2, 
and 
QI(y)  =~0[x0 ,0 ,Qo] (y )  with Qo~E; Qo(0)=l ,  
denoted by Q,(y)= F(Qt 1, 71, ~)(y). 
w0 (x,) ,  z, Q, t) be the probability for H that R be killed Let 4~ and ~u be given strategies. Let *~ ' 
at time T or before when x, = x, y, = y, z, = z, Q, = Q. Now, we have 
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f ~ ~ ~,[x,Q](u)~,[x,y,Q](v)W~Oe(x+u,v,y,F(Q,~,), t+l)  
UE Uad(X ) t'EI N 
W~(x,y,z,Q,t)= if x Cz and t <t/, 
0 if x : / : z  and t=t t  (and then, tc =T), 
1 if x=z  (and then t t=t) .  
We remark that the first term of the right-hand side of the equality does not depend on z, so 
we denote it by W~*(z, y, Q, t), furthermore by convention, we set W~e(x, y, Q, t 1) = O. 
Let W~'(x, Q, t) be the probability for R to be killed at time T or before when x, = x. Q, = Q. 
We have 
w~'(x,Q,t)= ~ Q(y)W~V(x,y,Q,t) for t>.l, 
I ' l l  N 
for t = 0. 
and 
W~(Xo, Qo, O) = w~V(xo, O,Qo, o) 
We define 
- - the H cost function by 
V(x,y,Q,t)=max ~ ~ q(v)~[x,Q](u)E~(x+u,v,F(Q,~,),t+l), 
qeXN uEUad(X ) vei N 
(41) 
where 
tP,[x,y, Q] =q*  belongs to the set of arguments of the maximum sought, the function V. is 
defined by 
V:" 12 × E × {0 . . . . .  tr} -~ B, B bounded 
fV(x,y,Q,t) if x Cz 
(x,y,Q,t)~ V:(x,y,Q,t)= ~O 1 if x~z  
if x =z, 
- - the R cost function by 
and t < tl. 
and t = t 1, 
V(x,Q,t)= ~ Q(y)V(x,y,Q,t) 
yE 1 N 
=min ~ Q(y) ~ ~p(u)~[x,y,Q](v)Vv(x+u,v,r(Q,~,),t+l), 
PEZU ve i  N UEUad(X) vel N 
where ~,[x, Q] =p*  belongs to the set of arguments of the minimum sought. 
Remark: The equality (42) is equivalent to this equality: 
v(x,Q,t)=min max ~ Q(y) ~ ~p(u)q(y)(v)E~.(x+u,v,F(Q,~',),t+l). 
pEEl;" qE[IsN= I~  r y~l N u~Uad(X) VEIN 
Remark: Thus, we have V:(x, y, Q, t) = W~o÷(X, y, z, Q, t), v w~ ÷ and P W~ ~ 
Let Q* be a solution of (43): 
Q*+l ( . )=  ~ Q*(y)~,[x,y,Q*](') for t>~l, 
y~l N 
Q*( ' )  = kfi0[x 0 ,0 ,Q*] ( ' )  with Q* such that Q~(0)= 1. 
Let ¢*(x0, U,_,) = ¢,[x,, Q*] and T*(Xo, U, ,, Vt_l) = ~J t [x t ,Y t ,  Qt ~] for all x,, y, in IN. 
(42) 
(43) 
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2 2 
U~ Uad{ ~:) '~1,, 
5.2. Theorem 
Theorem 3 
If it exists Q*, ¢b*, ~*, v from l ]x  E x {0 . . . . .  t/} to Bo, Bo bounded, F form 
IN X E x {0 . . . . .  t/} tO B~, B~ bounded verifying the equalities (41)-(43) then 
(i) Y (~* ,  7/*) = V(xo, 0, Q*,  0) = V(x  o, Q,*, 0),  
(ii) For all admissible strategies ¢b and 7 s, we have the following inequalities 
J(cb*, ¢P) ~< J (~*,  ~'*) ~< J(cp, tp,). 
Proof. First, notice that (41) implies that V = W~ '~* and P = W~ "~'. It follows the equality (i) 
of the theorem. 
Take now an arbitrary ~P. ~ and ~' together generate trajectories (depending on w). Let s--~ I Xt , 
{~}, {~} be such a trajectory. Also, let Q, be generated by (43) along this trajectory (i.e. placing 
and not ~u in the equation for Q,+~). Let t such that t < tt. 
We have 
E~(W+o+(.~,+,, y +,, z,+,, Q,+,, ~ + 1)/x,, Y,) 
~/,(v)~,[x,, Q,](u) m~÷(x, + u, v, y,, F@,,  ~) ,  t + I) 
if x~+l-Cz~+~ and t <t t ,  
0 if x, + ~ 4: z, + ~ and t = tr, 
1 if x ,+ l=z~+l .  
<<. W~oC'(x,,y,, z,, Q,, t) by definition of ~b. 
Then 
J(4>, re) = E+~ (W~o~ (X,,, ),,,, z,,, Q,,, ti)/xo), 
- E~(  .. E~'W~¢'x  - • t o t- ,,,Y,,, z,,, Q,,, tr)/X,, i, Y,, , ) . . .  IXo), 
with the increasing algebra property, 
<~ W~o+(Xo, o, 20, o) = w,*÷(Xo, o, 20, o), 
= j (~,  ~). 
So, we have J(q~*, ~)~< J(q)*, ~u,) for all admissible strategy ~P. 
Take now an arbitrary q~. ¢b and ~ together shall generate trajectories. Let {2,}, {~,} be such 
a trajectory. Let 2t be generated by (43) along this trajectory. Then, (Or) is the conditional 
distribution law of y, knowing X,. Let t such that t < t 1. By definition of W~ ~, we have 
W>*~(x,+,, Q,+,,t + I )= E(W~(x ,+, ,Y ,+, ,  Q,+,,t + I)/X,+,). 
Then 
E(W~'(x,+t,  Q,+,, t + 1)/X,) = E(E(W~(x ,+, ,y ,+, ,  Q,+,, t + l)/X,+,)/X,), 
= E(W~'(x,+~,y,+~, Q,+~, t + 1)/X,) since 
~(X,) = a(X,+,). 
So, we have 
E~÷(W~+(x,+,, Q +,, t + l)/x,) 
=E*c'(W~C'(x,+, ,Y,+,, Q,+,, t + 1)/X,), 
= Z 2, (Y)  Z ZP, (U)~,[x , ,Y  ,O- , ] (v )W~o¢(x ,+u 'v 'y 'F (2 ' '~ ' ) ' t+ l ) "  
V~I N u~l_,'ad(Xt) t'E],~¢ 
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Z O.,(y) E Z 4,[xt, O.,](u)q',[x,,y,O_t](v) 
yEI N UE Uad(Xt) VEI N 
× W0~÷(xt + u, v, y, F(~,,  kb,), t + 1), by definition of qfi, 
= E O_,(y)wf*(x,,y, O_t, t), 
y E I N 
= wf*(x,, 0.,, t). 
Then 
J (~,  ~)  = F-~ (W~* (xt:, Q.,:, t:)/Xo), 
= E~¢( . . .  E~÷(W~z÷(x,,  0_ 9, tj)/X!t ~ ) . . . /Xo)  with the increasing 
algebra property, 
> E(w~ ~ (x,j, 0.!,, t:)/xo) 
= s(4 ,  g'). 
So, we have J((P*, ~*) ~< j(7~, ~*)  for all admissible strategy ~. 
The set of inequations (41) and (42) is a saddle-point in p, q, with ~fi fixed in V, which must 
coincide with the optimal q in the saddle-point. The algorithm amounts therefore to solving what 
is essentially a fixed point problem ~b = q,(~b) at each point in the extended state space (x, Q, t). 
This is a formidable computational problem for large values of N, but can be tackled for small 
values. This is currently being attempted. 
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